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Abstract 
Although the effect of public expenditure efficiency on local government fiscal 
performance is widely-documented, what precisely explains expenditure efficiency 
remains largely unclear. Nevertheless, past research holds fiscal illusion as the most likely 
predictor and community sensitization very critical for fiscal illusion-expenditure 
efficiency formation. We employed fiscal illusion theory to investigate possible fiscal 
illusion-community sensitization-expenditure efficiency mediation in 16 districts, 6 
municipalities, and 160 sub-counties of Uganda’s northern region. Over the years, 
Uganda; an East African country, is applauded for its fiscal federalism proficiency. But 
presently, its northern region is grappling a 20-year post-conflict trauma likely to 
compromise entity spending efficiency. Structural equation modeling results suggest that 
all the four fiscal illusion constructs: fiscal imbalances, political divide, tax payment bias, 
and fiscal sabotage, predict changes in expenditure efficiency. However, community 
sensitization does not mediate the fiscal illusion-expenditure efficiency linkages. 
Implications for these findings and possible direction for future research are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sub-national entities particularly local governments are meant to provide public 
services of different kinds to their citizens. In developing countries such as those of Sub-
Saharan Africa, common public services at local level include: education, health, road 
networks, water and sanitation, and cultural and communal support (Afonso & Fernandes, 
2008; Gupta & Marijn, 2001). The fiscal federalism mandate also requires that the 
services must be of sustainable, high quality, and cost-effective nature (Gupta & Marijn, 
2001). However, attaining that obligation effectively necessitates pre-determined, 
properly-managed, and constantly-monitored spending. Mutually, this is what is termed 
public expenditure efficiency by public administration-related theory, research and 
practice (Clemens & Miran, 2012; Gupta & Marijn, 2001). 
As noted by Blair (2000) and most recently Clemens & Miran (2012), few entities 
in either the developed or developing world have ever attained acceptable levels of public 
expenditure efficiency. Hence, it is not clearly understood what precisely explains that 
problem. Much as resource-constraint, corruption, bureaucracy, tribal differences, and 
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partisan politics are frequently cited by related studies (e.g. Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; 
Gupta & Marijn, 2001) as predictors of public expenditure efficiency especially in Africa, 
the position is not decisive enough. 
Guided by fiscal illusion theory (Oates, 1991; Wagner, 1976), several scholars 
(notably Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001; Dell’Anno & 
Mourao, 2012), assert that public expenditure inefficiency is largely a function of fiscal 
illusion practices. However, other researchers such as Ferrari & Manzi (2014) and Francis 
& Robert (2003) maintain that much as fiscal illusion possibly predicts changes in public 
expenditure efficiency, that prediction cannot be sustainable without community 
sensitization. 
This study investigates fiscal illusion-public expenditure efficiency connections in 
selected local governments of Uganda, East Africa. It also examines whether community 
sensitization actually mediates the fiscal illusion-public expenditure efficiency 
relationship. For quite a long time, Uganda has been considered a proficient fiscal 
federalism player in Sub-Saharan Africa (Clemens & Miran, 2012). Its decentralization 
system rests on seven political and administrative regions that play host to one city 
(Kampala), 100 municipalities, 168 districts, and about 1,800 sub-counties. While the 
regions include: western, south-western, central, north-western, northern, north-eastern, 
and eastern, the district is the principle local entity in the country (Clemens & Miran, 
2012; Ferrari & Manzi, 2014). 
This paper makes three remarkable contributions to local government public 
expenditure efficiency literature. First, we introduce; apparently for the first time, a fiscal 
illusion-community sensitization-public expenditure efficiency model. This empirical 
innovation opens up opportunity for future scholars to carry out in-depth analysis of the 
otherwise chronic public expenditure efficiency problem. In practice, this will not only 
benefit African and other developing nations-based local entities, but also those in the 
developed world. Specifically, the model emphasizes the likely influence of community 
sensitization; a factor largely overlooked by past studies (e.g. Gemmell, Morrissey & 
Pinar, 2002; Mourao, 2006), in providing a sustainable solution to the expenditure 
efficiency dilemma. 
Second, much as the current research focuses on the operations of local 
governments in only one country; Uganda, its motives are in no way parochial or narrow-
minded. Rather it is a survey founded on a strong theoretical set-up (Oates, 1991; Wagner, 
1976) and guided by equally a wide literature framework (e.g. Blair, 2000; Congleton, 
2001; Ferrari & Manzi, 2014). In other words, the study’s empirical set-up covers a broad 
range of global fiscal federalism experiences. Such experiences are likely to significantly 
benefit imminent works. This is in the reality that local entities are not confined to 
promoting the well-being of local communities alone, but constitute a critical factor in 
the national macroeconomic-development agenda (Gupta & Marijn, 2001). 
Third, the study also targets entity administrators, employees, political 
representatives and the local communities. The idea is to draw their attention to the way 
public funds are expected to be spent and accordingly accounted for especially amidst 
resource scarcity and budgetary requirement realities. Consistent with evidence in the 
work of Gemmell, Morrissey and Pinar (2002), stakeholder appreciation and 
understandability of resource sourcing-expenditure linkages will greatly enhance 
expenditure efficiency. 
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THEORY, LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES STRUCTURE 
Public expenditure efficiency 
Public expenditure is considered efficient when; given the amount spent, that 
amount is capable of generating the largest benefit possible for a country’s population. 
However, decentralization policy broadly acknowledges that attaining expenditure 
efficiency especially at national level is not an easy task (Blair, 2000; Gupta & Marijn, 
2001). This is basically because measuring both costs and benefits associated with public 
outlay is quite a complex undertaking. 
          Consistent with the fiscal illusion theory (Oates, 1991; Wagner, 1976), this 
generally arises from either entity failure to appreciate the implication of government 
expenditure or local community failure to accurately perceive expenditure outcome. 
Further, Wagner (1976) relates fiscal illusion to lack of transparency in revenue collection 
leading to public expenditure misinterpretation and eventually inefficiency. 
          On that basis, various countries in both the developed and developing world have 
gone fiscal federalism ideally to achieve public expenditure efficiency (Devas, Delay & 
Hubbard, 2001). Under fiscal federalism jurisdiction, expenditure efficiency is considered 
fairly practical on the grounds of presumed related accountability, responsiveness, 
governance, and quality service delivery operational dimensions (Afonso & Fernandes, 
2008; Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001). 
          Essentially, as noted by Clemens and Miran (2012), public expenditure efficiency 
is feasible even in resource-constrained sub-national entities of developing countries as 
long as adequate technical commitment abounds. In congruence, related research (e.g. 
Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Blair, 2000) indicates that while technical commitment is 
pivotal, there must be regulatory compliance in respect to all executed expenditure. 
Moreover, completion of public service-related projects which signify cost-benefit 
uniformity is also indicative of public expenditure efficiency especially at local 
government level (Gupta & Marijn, 2001). 
Technical commitment 
          Local entity decision-makers and citizens play a critical role in paving the way 
public funds are supposed to be expended. This is especially so from public financial 
resource shortages and budgetary restrictions contexts typical of majority developing 
economies. As observed by Blair (2000) and Devas, Delay & Hubbard  (2001), in such 
jurisdictions, public resources must be spent according to sustainability, efficiency, 
efficacy and economy principles. Supported by published fiscal data (e.g. Gupta & 
Marijn, 2001), these principles enhance local community information accessibility 
relevant for effective monitoring and control of entity administrators activities. 
          However, attaining that outlay standard requires reliable technical skills, 
commitment and transparency (Clemens & Miran, 2012). In Sub-Saharan Africa, local 
governments are persistently plagued with substantial service delivery and backlog 
challenges, corruption, and poor budgetary and financial management. This is largely due 
to administrator-employee technical skills incapacitation (Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; 
Clemens & Miran, 2012). 
         In Ugandan-based districts, notable administrators include: resident district 
commissioner (RDC), chief administrative officer (CAO), local council 5 (LC5) 
chairperson, chief finance officer (CFO), heads of department, and community 
representatives. The district constitutes the principle and foundational local entity in the 
country’s decentralization structure (Blair, 2000; Gupta & Marijn, 2001). 
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          The RDC is directly appointed by the president to coordinate public services, 
advice the LC5 chairperson on national political and economic matters, and execute any 
other matters assigned by the president or prescribed by parliament. Practice and research 
(e.g. Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Clemens & Miran, 2012) have shown that majority 
RDCs in the country are appointed on political grounds and generally lack public finance 
technical knowledge and skills. 
          The CAO; appointed by public service commission at national level, would be 
technical but their capacity is often compromised by tribalism and partisan politics. Heads 
of department, employees and community representatives are appointed by the district 
service commission largely on sectarian, tribal and political considerations (Blair, 2000; 
Clemens & Miran, 2012). 
Amidst the foregoing personnel appointment inconsistencies and lack of 
operational autonomy, it explains why various past studies (e.g. Blair, 2000; Congleton, 
2001; Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Mourao, 2006), persistently advocate for local entity 
autonomy in order to secure community services. Furthermore, and perhaps most 
terrifyingly, this situation also expounds why some scholars (Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; 
Clemens & Miran, 2012; Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012) have for long envisioned reversal 
towards centralization as the only panacea to the expenditure efficiency problem in 
Africa.  
Regulatory compliance  
          When local governments act within the parameters of budgetary and financial 
management law, they regulate and manage public expenditure under their control 
effectively. Fiscal illusion theory (Oates, 1991; Wagner, 1976), research (e.g. Blair, 2000; 
Clemens & Miran, 2012; Congleton, 2001), and fiscal federalism policy posit that public 
spending responsibility be preferably executed by authorities closest to the communities. 
          Given their technical competencies, these entity administrators will execute their 
expenditure mandates within the law. Besides, Clemens & Miran (2012) suggest that in 
resource-strained and corruption-ridden entities such as those of Africa, central 
governments intervention be limited. For instance, higher authorities should only come 
in when local spending coordination and discharge is persistently inefficient. 
          Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa; to name but a few Sub-
Saharan Africa countries, operate tightly-regulated public expenditure mechanisms 
(Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012). However, what undermines 
judicial systems in these countries; notably that of Uganda, is lack of independence in 
handling particularly fiscal corruption and accountability incidences (Dell’Anno & 
Mourao, 2012). 
Projects completion 
          Globally, public service projects require huge amounts of fiscal and other resources 
in order to be set-up. Key projects include: education and health facilities, road networks, 
and water and sanitation amenities. In Africa, the largely rural-based projects are mainly 
financed by inter-governmental fiscal transfers (grants) and donor aid. Over the years, 
empirical evidence (Blair, 2000; Ferrari & Manzi, 2014; Gupta & Marijn, 2001; Mourao, 
2006) highlights community-based projects completion as the most crucial public 
expenditure efficiency challenge faced by majority local entities in the region. 
          Although funded by central government-highly monitored conditional grants and 
donor aid, few projects are satisfactorily completed. Inter alia, the works of Ferrari and 
Manzi (2014) and Mourao (2006) identify budgetary inconsistency and technical 
incapacitation as the most salient factors responsible for projects completion 
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complications in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, in the case of Ugandan-based projects, 
Gupta & Marijn (2001) claim that lack of entity fiscal autonomy and corruption betray 
completion efforts at local levels. 
Fiscal illusion 
          For quite a long time, past research (e.g. Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Devas, 
Delay & Hubbard, 2001; Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012), has attributed local government 
failure to attain public expenditure efficiency to fiscal illusion. However, over the years, 
little significant effort has been taken to carry out an effective empirical investigation of 
the fiscal illusion-public expenditure efficiency linkages particularly in Africa-based 
local entities. According to Dollery & Worthington (1996) and more recently Dell’Anno 
& Mourao (2012), fiscal illusion is the prospect that entity costs and benefits may 
consistently be misconstrued by the local community. 
          Notably, Dell’Anno & Mourao (2012) highlight five economics-founded fiscal 
illusion generic attributes: revenue complexity, revenue elasticity, flypaper effect, renter 
illusion, and debt illusion. Accordingly, it is the flypaper effect and renter-illusion 
dimensions that explain the fiscal illusion prediction of public expenditure efficiency in 
local government (Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001; Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012). 
          The flypaper concept holds that there is often a hypothesized tendency for central 
government grants; meant to finance local entity programs, to increase public expenditure 
by more than an equivalent increment in other forms of local revenue (Dell’Anno & 
Mourao, 2012; Guziejewska, 2016). Consequently, local administrators and community 
misperception that grants are gifts leads to expenditure mismanagement and inefficiency. 
It also makes the local taxpayers underestimate the reality that their tax liability increases 
correspondingly with those at national level (Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Guziejewska, 
2016). 
          According to Devas, Delay & Hubbard (2001), renter-illusion rests on the reality 
that various local governments in majority fiscal federalism jurisdictions largely rely on 
property tax. The underlying assumption is that those communities that own property and 
are thus directly levied, will always correctly estimate public goods and services tax 
prices (Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001). 
          However, given the high illiteracy rate and lack of technical capacity among the 
local populace especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, tax price estimates are rarely accurate. 
This misconception leads local entity administrators to often mismanage expenditure and 
breed unnecessary spending inefficiency (Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001; Guziejewska, 
2016). 
Beneath the fiscal illusion-flypaper effect-renter illusion triangulation, resides four 
critical factors that recent studies (e.g. Congleton, 2001; Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012; 
Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 2002; Guziejewska, 2016; Mourao, 2006) claim predict 
changes in public expenditure efficiency especially in African local entities. These are: 
fiscal imbalances, political divide, tax payment bias, and fiscal sabotage. 
Fiscal imbalances 
          At the heart of the fiscal federalism policy lies intergovernmental grants. Grants 
are meant to finance political, administrative, and economic activities at sub-national 
level otherwise executed by central government. Fiscal federalism advocates (e.g. Devas, 
Delay & Hubbard, 2001; Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 2002; Mourao, 2006) argue that 
these fiscal transfers create multi-tiered governmental fiscal equity and equilibrium 
necessary for generating balanced macroeconomic stability and development. 
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          However, in more recent empirical work, some scholars; notably Dell’Anno & 
Mourao (2012), and Guziejewska (2016) remain highly skeptical about the traditionally 
and often acclaimed role grants play in particularly local government fiscal machinery. 
The researchers identified a strikingly similar pattern in decentralized countries of both 
the developed and developing world: both vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances 
created by intergovernmental grants breed free-spending tendencies in majority sub-
national entities of most countries (Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012). 
          Free-spending; a strong indicator of public expenditure inefficiency, eventually 
culminates into unsustainable fiscal deficits. Shortly thereafter, the perpetrator local entity 
calls upon central government to provide special bail-out transfers (supplementary 
budgets) or otherwise assume the liability (Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012). 
Accordingly, this implies that fiscal federalism indirectly extends mandate to some 
local entities to spend unnecessarily but transfer the cost burden to others. Moreover, the 
unfair fiscal mandate does not only hamper inter-entity competition; but as noted 
Guziejewska (2016), intergovernmental grants-generated fiscal imbalances significantly 
distort local revenue-grants linkages. 
          Consistent with the fiscal illusion theory (Oates, 1991; Wagner, 1976), in weak 
fiscal federalism jurisdictions such as those of Sub-Saharan Africa, entity administrators 
take advantage of uncoordinated local revenue-grants setups and related fiscal illusion 
misperception to overspend. Additionally, it has also been empirically demonstrated 
(Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001; Mourao, 2006) from the flypaper effect context, that 
even if grant amounts are increased, they cannot lead to local tax reduction. 
          In Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, and specifically Uganda, frequent increments in 
grants levels have instead stimulated more public spending in local governments. 
Unfortunately, given the country’s local entity questionable technical capacities, rampant 
corruption and rent-seeking practices, public expenditure inefficiency has been the norm 
(Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001; Guziejewska, 2016; Mourao, 2006). From the foregoing 
seemingly-endless fiscal imbalances-public expenditure efficiency deliberation, the 
following hypothesis is therefore proposed:  
Hypothesis 1: Fiscal imbalances are positively related to public expenditure efficiency. 
Political divide 
          Decentralizing political, administrative, and fiscal powers from central government 
to sub-national entities is basically a political initiative (Mourao, 2006). In fiscal matters, 
the politics further determines who should play which role in the sub-national budgetary 
and financial management systems. Furthermore, politics also sets the judicial structure 
under which various fiscal matters are governed (Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001; 
Mourao, 2006). 
          As notes Congleton (2001), local entity leadership often measured by the 
percentage of council seats held by the ruling political party, has substantial influence on 
expenditure efficiency. This is particularly the case in autocratic democracies where 
opposition party views are often sidelined. Besides, some scholars (e.g. Dell’Anno & 
Mourao, 2012; Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 2002; Guziejewska, 2016) posit that the 
dictatorial approach employed in fiscal spending, heavily distorts the local revenue-grants 
structure and stimulates fiscal illusion misperception. 
          In Ugandan and South African-based local jurisdictions; for instance, often 
compromised democratic checks and balances arising from political divide, continually 
engender poor service delivery (Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001; Guziejewska, 2016). 
The preceding insight leads to this hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Political divide and public expenditure efficiency are positively related. 
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Tax payment bias 
          Both Oates (1991) and Wagner (1976); in their fiscal illusion theory propositions, 
commend decentralization and particularly fiscal federalism as the most ideal instrument 
of managing differences in local services tastes. Besides, it is a realistic tool that voters 
can employ to control entity administrators and political representatives’ performance 
effectively (Wagner, 1976). To this end, Oates (1991) relates the performance dimension 
to a balanced, autonomous, and reliable local tax system. Such a tax performing system 
is capable of administering various types of taxes, fees, licenses, and charges 
simultaneously and in the most effective manner. 
          In practice, however, majority local tax authorities especially in resource-
constrained economies of Sub-Saharan Africa, operate generally-balanced local tax 
systems but prone to perpetual tax payment bias. Empirical evidence (Congleton, 2001; 
Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001; Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Gemmell, Morrissey & 
Pinar, 2002) indicates that various local tax authorities in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Uganda, and South Africa; to name but a few, tend to emphasize property tax 
administration. 
In Uganda, for instance, local governments generate their local revenue from 
property tax, local service tax, market dues, licenses, and various types of fees, but 
property tax is most underscored (Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Gemmell, Morrissey & 
Pinar, 2002). 
          The related policy stand is that that property tax is the only reliable and most 
effective form of taxation given its administration convenience. Additionally, it is the 
only form of tax with capacity of providing proper local entity incentives that can easily 
generate quality services. The services do not only raise community property value but 
ultimately empower revenue collection capacity (Congleton, 2001; Gemmell, Morrissey 
& Pinar, 2002). 
          However, recent research (e.g. Clemens & Miran, 2012; Dell’Anno & Mourao, 
2012; Guziejewska, 2016) cautions that reliance on a single tax source breeds taxpayer 
bias and eventually tax evasion. Tax evasion has traditionally been associated with poor 
revenue collection, exacerbation of corruption and rent-seeking practices, fiscal transfers 
over-dependence, budget incrementalism, and inevitably fiscal illusion misperception 
(Clemens & Miran, 2012 Guziejewska, 2016). However autonomous a local entity may 
be, when it operates in such as a fiscal environment, its public expenditure efficiency 
endeavors must be restrained (Guziejewska, 2016). In sum, the Dell’Anno & Mourao 
(2012) perspective that local entities compromise their own public expenditure efficiency 
drive, may be substantive. We therefore propose that: 
Hypothesis 3: Tax payment bias and public expenditure efficiency have a positive 
relationship. 
Fiscal sabotage 
          In Sub-Saharan Africa, like other regions of both the developed and developing 
world, several countries operate fairly properly-decentralized governance and 
administrative structures (Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Gupta & Marijn, 2001). Indeed 
countries like Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda, have over the years been 
acclaimed for particularly well-organized fiscal decentralization systems. These systems 
are largely funded by intergovernmental fiscal transfers and often supported by donor aid 
(Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Clemens & Miran, 2012). 
         Some scholars (e.g. Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012; Dollery & Worthington, 1996; 
Guziejewska, 2016) claim that the fiscal transfers-local revenue bases setup is not only 
associated with fiscal imbalances, but most importantly, generates fiscal illusion and 
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associated expenditure inefficiency. Accordingly, government administrators and 
political representatives in several local jurisdictions across Africa, consider the fiscal 
imbalances-fiscal illusion-inevitable expenditure inefficiency triangulation some form of 
fiscal sabotage (Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012; Guziejewska, 2016). 
          In Uganda, for instance, this fiscal sabotage act has been perceived a deliberate 
political move designed to frustrate existing local authority fiscal mandates and get 
opportunity to create more districts (Clemens & Miran, 2012; Dollery & Worthington, 
1996; Guziejewska, 2016). From less than 40 districts when the country adopted 
decentralization system in the early 1990s, today Uganda boasts of beyond 140 districts 
(Guziejewska, 2016). 
          Consistent with fiscal illusion theory (Oates, 1991; Wagner, 1976), current fiscal 
federalism research (e.g. Congleton, 2001; Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 2002; Mourao, 
2006) cautions that grantors who take advantage of fiscal illusion misperceptions to 
destabilize local entity operations, equally undermine their long-term macroeconomic 
growth-development objective. Moreover, creating unnecessarily large numbers of 
districts and other local entities can neither promote fiscal federalism, achieve public 
expenditure efficiency, nor gain local community service popularity. 
It simply constitutes political backwardness and lack of fiscal foresight (Clemens 
& Miran, 2012; Guziejewska, 2016). Accordingly, the ensuing hypothesis abounds: 
Hypothesis 4: Fiscal sabotage and public expenditure efficiency should be positively 
related. 
Community sensitization 
          As noted in the introductory remarks of the current research, sub-national entities 
particularly local governments are meant to provide various kinds of public services to 
their citizens, the community. Afonso & Fernandes (2008), but earlier Gupta & Marijn 
(2001), identified services such as education, health, road networks, water and sanitation, 
and cultural and communal support as the most prevalent. This implies that communities 
must; firstly, be fully aware of the kind of services they require for development purposes, 
and secondly, the monetary and fiscal cost implications of these services. In cost terms, 
society must then properly appreciate how that cost is funded (Gupta & Marijn, 2001; 
Guziejewska, 2016). 
          From their community sensitization empirical stand, Ferrari & Manzi (2014) & 
Francis & Robert (2003) emphasize that local communities in modern fiscal federalism 
nations; including those of Africa, are expected to understand the four basic local revenue 
sources. These are local tax, fiscal transfers, donor aid, and loans. Or else, it is the duty 
of relevant authorities to timely sensitize society on this matter. Furthermore, the 
community must also be fully-conversant with the public expenditure-service benefit 
equation (Ferrari & Manzi, 2014). 
          Fiscal illusion has for long been empirically identified with public expenditure-
benefits community misperception. Given that citizens of majority communities in the 
developing world particularly those of Africa are largely illiterate, politicians often take 
advantage of this fiscal knowledge gap to mislead the population (Ferrari & Manzi, 2014; 
Mourao, 2006). Moreover, entity administrators working in collaboration with the rent-
seeking politicians, deliberately mismanage the available fiscal resources since the 
accountability mechanism is simply too weak (Mourao, 2006). 
          Some studies (e.g. Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012; Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 
2002; Guziejewska, 2016) have also identified Ethiopian, South African, and Ugandan 
partisan politics and their more or less non-independent judicial systems with community 
sensitization deficiencies. For instance, Dell’Anno & Mourao (2012) claim that politics 
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and judicial impunity in these countries, significantly betray community sensitization on 
public expenditure concerns. 
Consequently, public expenditure efficiency endeavors in majority of their local 
entities only exist in theory but practically, they largely remain a fiscal dream (Dell’Anno 
& Mourao, 2012).  
Therefore, in order to establish the precise position of community sensitization-
fiscal illusion-public expenditure efficiency linkages in local government, the following 
hypothesis was tested:   
Hypothesis 5: Community sensitization mediates the relationship between fiscal illusion 
and  public expenditure efficiency. 
 
METHODS  
          Fiscal illusion and the local government public expenditure efficiency problem 
especially in Africa are generally considered extremely complex dimensions (Clemens & 
Miran, 2012; Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012; Ferrari & Manzi, 2014). Thus, an investigation 
that involves establishing fiscal illusion-community sensitization-public expenditure 
efficiency linkages in such a resource-strained setting requires an equally effective 
research design (Cheung & Lau, 2008). 
          As recommended by various past studies (e.g. Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008; 
Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2008), this research therefore engaged cross-sectional design 
given its capacity to generate rich and reliable data. The district, municipality, and sub-
county were the study units of analysis while their administrators, employees, and 
community political representatives were its units of inquiry. 
Sample 
          Hypotheses proposed in this study were tested using 255 questionnaires 
administered in 16 districts, 6 municipalities, and 160 sub-counties located in the 
northern-post conflict region of Uganda. The country’s northern region; comprising of 
both Acholi and Lango sub-regions and a host to a series of public infrastructural projects, 
was purposively targeted given its perpetual public expenditure efficiency complications 
(Clemens & Miran, 2012; Ferrari & Manzi, 2014). 
          Sample participants included: 17% administrators (chief administrative officers, 
resident district commissioners, town clerks and local council 5 chairpersons), 19% chief 
finance officers, 24% heads of department, 30% finance operations-related employees, 
and 10% community representatives. By means of a stratified sampling method (Cheung 
& Lau, 2008; Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2008), the participants were chosen randomly and 
purposively based on: position held (from all levels and job classification), period served 
(well-established and newer staff), and their stations in various localities. 
          However, due to sampling attrition (Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2008), only 246 
questionnaires (response rate 96%) were statistically analyzed. The response rate meets 
the empirical minimum of 65% for such studies (Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Hooper, 
Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). Participant biographical assessment revealed that 63% of 
them are male and the rest female but with mean age bracket of 40 years (SD=1.804). 
Notably too, 64% of the respondents were married and 20% of them single. 
Majority of them (62%), are first degree-and-above certificate holders, while 21% hold 
diplomas. In terms of period served in various entity capacities, most respondents (61%) 
have occupied their positions for a period between 6 and 10 years. 
         Consistent with past research related to other parts of Africa (e.g. Gemmell, 
Morrissey & Pinar, 2002; Gupta & Marijn, 2001), the present study suggests that the 
surveyed local governments engage fairly well-educated personnel. Moreover, they 
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operate with a gender-balance focus, targeting manpower of middle age, with family 
responsibility, and potential to serve for a long time in future (Gemmell, Morrissey & 
Pinar, 2002). 
Analytical procedures 
          In line with previous research (e.g. Cheung & Lau, 2008; Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 
2008), the present study’s descriptive and inferential statistics were generated using the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) package. Accordingly, its instrument 
reliability and validity, and variable means, standard deviations, multicollinearity, 
correlation and prediction (regression) status were established. Cheung & Lau (2008) and 
Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh (2008) suggest that such preliminary statistics are critical for 
subsequent reliable hypothesis test results. 
          Proposed hypotheses were tested for both direct and indirect (mediation) effects by 
means of structural equation analysis (SEM) methodology rooted in the globally-
acclaimed (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008; Ketchen, 
Boyd & Bergh, 2008) Analysis of Moments Structures (AMOS) software. 
          In order to effectively verify the direct and mediation properties anticipated in the 
study hypothetical model, SEM was engaged on the recommended (Hooper, Coughlan & 
Mullen, 2008; Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2008) two-step approach. According to Hooper, 
Coughlan & Mullen (2008), the bi-step tactic that engenders a measurement model and a 
structural model, significantly facilitates study variable-original data consistency 
verification. While the measurement model supports generation of goodness-of-fit indices 
required for general hypothesis effects testing, the structural model specially highlights 
mediation estimation statistics (Cheung & Lau, 2008; Edwards & Lambert, 2007).  
Measures 
In order to measure the various variable constructs of the study, previous research 
scales were adopted but modified accordingly. Devas, Delay & Hubbard (2001) and 
Edwards & Lambert (2007) applaud this approach for its effectiveness in measuring 
social science-related constructs. Thus: 
Technical commitment 
The construct technical commitment was assessed by 13 items (α = 0.827) developed 
along the lines in validated scales employed by Blair (2000) and Gupta & Marijn (2001). 
Sample item: “This entity employs manpower with relevant technical capacity.” 
Regulatory compliance 
On the basis of 12 items (α = 0.813) closely related to those in the modified scale of 
Afonso & Fernandes (2008) research, the attribute regulatory compliance was measured. 
One of such items included the following: “Current expenditure efficiency regulations 
favor entity environment.” 
Projects completion 
The 15 items (α = 0.791); sample: “Most infrastructure-related projects in this local 
government have never been fully completed since initiation”, developed along the 
tailored Clemens & Miran (2012) scales, was adopted in verifying the concept projects 
completion. 
Fiscal imbalances 
The scales in the empirical work of Congleton (2001) and Mourao (2006) were 
systematically adjusted to help support the 15 items (α = 0.854) that were used in 
verifying the construct fiscal imbalances of this study. One of such items ran as follows: 
“This entity is relatively competitive because of fiscal imbalances.” 
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Political divide 
A modified scale drawn from previous research (Dollery & Worthington, 1996) was 
employed by the current study to investigate the attribute political divide. The item: “[…] 
fiscal expenditure issues are handled along political lines” was one of the 12 items (α = 
0.799) that constituted the tailored scale. 
Tax payment bias 
The construct; tax payment bias, was tested using 14 items (α = 0.863). The items were 
structured on statistical scales employed by Devas, Delay & Hubbard (2001) and Mourao 
(2006) and one of such items read as follows: “The tax collection system employed by 
this entity is very fair.” 
Fiscal sabotage 
Fiscal sabotage as a predictor of public expenditure efficiency in local government was 
measured by an (α = 0.824)-based 14 item scale. The Dell’Anno & Mourao (2012) 
adapted scale facilitated the items including: “[…] expenditure sabotage is openly 
apparent.” 
Community sensitization 
          As indicated earlier, community sensitization was a factor hypothesized to mediate 
the fiscal illusion-public expenditure efficiency relationship in local entities. 
Accordingly, a 15-item (α = 0.881) modified scale adopted from related empirical works 
(Ferrari & Manzi, 2014; Francis & Robert, 2003), was employed to measure it. 
One such item was: “The local community surrounding this entity fully appreciates 
its expenditure activities.” In sum, the foregoing construct assessment identities largely 
suggest that their respective individual study variables hold internal consistence 
(reliability) levels (0.65 < α < 0.95) generally embraced by majority statistical circles 
(Cheung & Lau, 2008; Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 2002; Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 
2008). 
Control variables 
          According to past research (e.g. Cheung & Lau, 2008; Clemens & Miran, 2012; 
Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2008), participant biographic attributes potentially impair 
hypothesis test results. The effect can be minimized if they are controlled for (Clemens 
& Miran, 2012; Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2008). Thus, in the current study, biographic 
characteristics: gender, age, marital status, educational level, position held, and tenure, 
were controlled for as follows: [Gender: (0=female, n=91; 1=male, n=155)]; [Age in 
years: (1=20-30, n=37; 2=31-40, n=161; 3=41+, n=48)]; [Marital status: (1=single, n=49; 
2=married, n=157; 3=others n=40)]; [Educational level: (1=certificate, n=41; 2=diploma, 
n=52; 3=bachelor’s degree+, n=153)]; [Job tenure in years: (1=1-3, n=69; 2=6-10, n=150; 
3=7+, n=27)]. 
          Moreover, we also controlled for a latent factor formally adopted to augment the 
study instrument validity testing. Empirical convention (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; 
Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008) requires that such factors be subjected to a 
confirmatory factor analysis-based Harman’s One Factor verification if validity is to be 
meaningfully established. However, given the factor’s potential influence on hypothesis 
test results, it has to be controlled for accordingly (Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Results 
The correlations alongside means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for the model 
variable and construct ratings are presented in Table 1. Generally, the ratings evidence 
moderate to strong positive inter-correlations. For instance: public expenditure efficiency 
has a positive and a moderate relationship with fiscal illusion (r = .38, p < .05) but relates 
more strongly with community sensitization (r = .45, p < .01). 
Table 1. Variable means (M), standard deviations (SD), reliability (α), and correlations 
# Item M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 FI 3.29 1.53 .81 1          
2 PD 2.99 1.54 .79 .34**          
3 TPB 3.11 1.51 .88 -.19* .23**         
4 FS 3.00 1.56 .83 .16* .34 .45**        
5 FIL 2.77 1.63 .76 .23** .41** -.31 .44**       
6 CS 3.15 1.46 .82 .37* -.22 .18 .13* .49*      
7 TC 3.04 1.59 .73 -.42* .35* -.26 -.31 -.27** .53**     
8 RC 2.97 1.61 .78 -.34 .19 -.25 .33** .46 -.10 .28**    
9 PC 2.98 1.57 .84 .42 -.28* .51 .21 .36** .15* .12 .40**   
10 PEE 2.86 1.52 .86 .27* .35** .14** .26* .38* .45** .32 .18** .38** 1 
Notes: n=246; FI=Fiscal Imbalances; PD=Political Divide; TPB=Tax Payment Bias; FS=Fiscal Sabotage; 
FIL=Fiscal Illusion; CS=Community Sensitization; TC=Technical Commitment; RC=Regulatory 
Compliance; PC=Projects Completion; PEE=Public Expenditure Efficiency; **Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); Study 
variables are in bold. 
Besides, community sensitization relates with fiscal illusion to the extent of (r = 
.49, p < .01). Such results are practically and empirically expected (see Afonso & 
Fernandes, 2008; Mourao, 2006) given the misperception fiscal illusion creates to local 
communities in regard to entity spending mandates. This is confirmed by the technical 
commitment-fiscal illusion negative and significant association (r = -.27, p < .01) 
suggesting how the fiscal illusion-rooted misperception impairs technical commitment 
(Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 2002).  
          A combination of hierarchical regression and structural equation modelling (path) 
analyses (Cheung & Lau, 2008) was employed to test proposed hypotheses direct and 
mediation effects. Moreover, bootstrapping confidence interval (CI)-based analysis was 
engaged to reaffirm the SEM-generated mediation results (Cheung & Lau, 2008; Hooper, 
Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). All the said results are presented in Table 2. 
          As indicated earlier, Harman’s One Factor analysis was performed to test the study 
instrument’s construct and discriminate validity status. The collective validity stand 
obtains when Harman’s indices compare badly with those of the measurement model 
(Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). Indices for Harman’s 
model were as follows: (χ2 =7.805; df = 11; χ2/df = 0.710; IFI = 0.665; TLI = 0.741; CFI 
= 0.893; RMSEA = 0.217; L.046, H.134). 
Those of the adopted five-factor measurement model were: (χ2 =15.856; df = 8; χ2/df = 
1.982; IFI = 0.974; TLI = 0.991; CFI = 0.982; RMSEA = 0.028; L.000, H.104). Since the 
Harman model results compared badly to those of the measurement model, the situation 
implies strong instrument validity (Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). 
          The structural model indices required in verifying hypotheses direct and mediation 
effects were as follows: direct effect [Chi-Square (χ2df)=.171; df=1; p=.679; (χ2/df)=.171; 
GFI=.991; NFI=.999; RFI=.988; IFI=1.004; TLI=1.064; CFI=1.000; 
RMSEA=.026(L.127; H.760) at 90]; indirect effect [Chi-Square (χ2df)=.012; df=1; 
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p=.912; (χ2/df)=.012; GFI=.989; NFI=.991; RFI=.999; IFI=1.014; TLI=1.044; CFI=.998; 
RMSEA=.051(L.000; H.068) at 90]. 
Previous simulation research (e.g. Congleton, 2001; Gupta & Marijn, 2001; Ketchen, 
Boyd & Bergh, 2008) also commends such results as evidence of a robust structural model 
whose analysis has the potential of begetting reliable hypothesis test results. 
As displayed in Table 2, a positve and significant predictive relationship (β = 0.954, p < 
.05) exists between fiscal imbalances and public expenditure efficiency. These results 
suggest data support to Hypothesis 1. 
          Similarly, the results for Hypothesis 2 (β = 0.621, p < .01) indicate a positive and 
significant projective association between political divide and public expenditure 
efficiency. It had also been proposed as Hypothesis 3 that tax payment bias in surveyed 
local entities, predicts changes in public expenditure efficiency. The Table 2 results (β = 
0.734, p < .05), also indicate data support for this empirical proposition. The last 
hypothesis direct effect proposal; Hypothesis 4, was that fiscal sabotage explains public 
expenditure efficiency in such jurisdictions. Statistical findings (β = 0.848, p < .05), 
signify a positive and significant fiscal sabotage-expenditure efficiency linkage 
suggesting related data backing. 
Table 2. Hypotheses analysis 
Dependent Variable: Public Expenditure Efficiency 
Particulars β SE t TV VIF 
Direct Effects      
Fiscal Imbalances → Public Expenditure Efficiency .954* .36 2.64 .62 1.64 
Political Divide  → Public Expenditure Efficiency .621** .29 1.89 .68 3.48 
Tax Payment Bias → Public Expenditure Efficeincy 
Fiscal Sabotage → Public Expenditure Efficiency 
.734* 
.848* 
.81 
.53 
1.53 
2.17 
.45 
.53 
2.31 
4.03 
Indirect Effect      
Fiscal Illusion →Community Sensitization → Public Exp. Efficiency   -.538 .47 2.24 .37 3.06 
Adjusted R2 [.718]      
Bootstrapping Results: Indirect Effect (CI) [-0.093 ↔ 0.035]      
Notes: n = 246; SE = Standard Error; TV = Tolerance Value; VIF =Variable Inflation Factor; Public Exp. 
Efficiency = Public Expenditure Efficiency; Standardized Beta Coefficents Reported; *p < .05; **p 
< .01; Bootstrap Sample Size = 2000; CI = Confidence Interval. 
          Most critically, however, it had been projected as Hypothesis 5, that community 
sensitization mediates the fiscal illusion-public expenditure efficiency relationship in 
local government. The convetional structural equation modeling (Edwards & Lambert, 
2007; Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008); Table 2 hypothesis indirect effect analysis 
results (β = -0.538, ns), suggest a negative and non-significant community sensitization 
mediation effect to that relationship. This implies that data from surveyed Ugandan-based 
entities could not support that hypothesis. Conversely, some scholars; notably Cheung 
and Lau (2008), hold reservations on the authenticity of regular SEM-based hypothesized 
indirect effect outcome. The two researchers argue that much as SEM is admittedly a 
robust simulation test technique, its mediation results are often compromised by structural 
model defects. 
          Accordingly, the current study’s community sensitization factor was therefore 
subjected to further mediation verification: bootstrap testing (Cheung & Lau, 2008). Also 
rooted in the AMOS-SEM package, bootstrapping is globally perceived a more in-depth 
indirect effect testing technique by several statistical analysts (Cheung & Lau, 2008; 
Clemens & Miran, 2012). 
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On the basis of 2000 micro-samples, the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap employed in 
this study, produced a zero-content confidence interval (CI) of [-0.093 ↔ 0.035]. 
According to Cheung & Lau (2008), the moment a bootstrap CI or range holds a zero 
value within it; it is a full confirmation that a mediation influence does not exist. 
          The current study’s statistical results: correlation, regression, structural equation 
modeling, and bootstrapping, are deemed quite reliable given its robust data structure. 
Notably, the dataset’s common methods variance and multi-collinearity threats are very 
minimal. As shown in previous research (e.g. Blair, 2000; Edwards & Lambert, 2007; 
Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2008; Mourao, 2006), data with tolerance values (TV) (≤ 1.00) 
and variable inflation factors (VIF) (≤ 10.00) are considered generally safe from the 
multi-collinearity threat. The study TV and VIF values presented in Table 2 meet these 
standards. 
Discussion 
          The ensuing discussion of the present study’s findings is undertaken variously from 
the context of contemporary theoretical, empirical, and practice environments. It is also 
important to note that; much as majority findings corroborate previous literature, several 
of them introduce quite innovative ideas to the local government expenditure efficiency 
knowledge body. 
          For instance, it had been proposed as Hypothesis 1 that fiscal imbalances relate 
positively with public expenditure efficiency in local government. Data generated from 
surveyed entities in northern Uganda supported that hypothesis. Moreover, this finding is 
in congruence with earlier empirical evidence in the work of Dollery & Worthington 
(1996). Recently Dell’Anno & Mourao (2012) also assert that fiscal imbalances explain 
changes in expenditure efficiency in such localities. 
          Consistent with the fiscal illusion theory (Oates, 1991; Wagner, 1976), local 
entities should institute measures that can mitigate fiscal illusion-related misperception 
often responsible for spending inefficiency. Dell’Anno & Mourao (2012) suggest 
independent judicial systems, partisan politics maturity, and fiscal transparency as notable 
measures for Sub-Saharan Africa localities. 
          In Hypothesis 2, it had been anticipated political divide and public expenditure 
efficiency also have positive linkages. Oates (1991) posits in the fiscal illusion theory that 
the moment local jurisdictions operate in divided political environments; their 
expenditure efficiency measures will always be compromised. 
This enforces the Wagner (1976) and recent research (e.g. Dell’Anno & Mourao, 
2012; Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 2002; Guziejewska, 2016) observation that it is 
politics that determines local spending mandates especially in resource-strained 
economies of the developing world. 
          Thus, any flaws in the political machinery seriously undermine expenditure goals 
(Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 2002; Guziejewska, 2016). Ugandan-based local 
governments are a living example as victims of the foregoing political divide-public 
expenditure efficiency triangulation (Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012; Gemmell, Morrissey 
& Pinar, 2002). Past studies; notably (Congleton, 2001; Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001; 
Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar, 2002), provide empirical 
evidence that: tax payment bias significantly affects public expenditure efficiency in local 
government. 
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          Moreover, according to Oates (1991)’s fiscal illusion theoretical perspective, local 
spending proficiency is a function of balanced tax payment systems. This research had 
predicted particularly in its Hypothesis 3, that tax payment bias has a positive bearing to 
public expenditure efficiency in local entities. 
Thus, the practical implication for local authorities in Africa; Uganda’s entities 
inclusive, is that realistic and stable tax systems are inevitable for expenditure efficiency. 
          Conventional logic, theory, and empirical evidence (e.g. Clemens & Miran, 2012; 
Dollery & Worthington, 1996; Guziejewska, 2016) categorically indicate that fiscal 
sabotage must be responsible for public expenditure inefficiency in local jurisdictions. As 
stated in the present study’s Hypothesis 4, fiscal sabotage indeed associates positively 
with public expenditure efficiency. 
          Both Oates (1991) and Wagner (1976) cautioned public entities on the potential 
risks fiscal sabotage pose to spending endeavors and as confirmed practically, several 
Sub-Saharan African entities have fallen victims. Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, 
and Uganda; to name but a few African countries, frequently acknowledge political-
related fiscal sabotage. The practice has tremendously undermined their fiscal federalism 
systems but especially local spending efficiency (Dollery & Worthington, 1996; 
Guziejewska, 2016). 
          Finally, it had been postulated in Hypothesis 5 of this research that in local entities, 
community sensitization mediates the relationship between fiscal illusion and public 
expenditure efficiency. Contrary to past empirical stand, notably: Ferrari & Manzi (2014), 
and Francis & Robert (2003), data did not render support to the hypothesis test results. 
Such findings may arise in post-conflict traumatized societies such as that of northern 
Uganda in which this study was conducted. Driven by fiscal illusion misperception 
(Clemens & Miran, 2012; Guziejewska, 2016; Oates, 1991) typical of resource-
constrained African entities, traumatized communities may find it a challenge to 
appreciate public spending efficiency sensitization benefits. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion 
Possibly, this study is one of the very first efforts to address the issue of local entity 
public expenditure efficiency from a fiscal illusion theoretical perspective and 
particularly in a post-conflict environment of Sub-Saharan Africa. Previous research (e.g. 
Blair, 2000; Clemens & Miran, 2012; Dollery & Worthington, 1996), has largely 
neglected the matter especially when it obtains in a post-war setting. Its findings are 
therefore considered a significant contribution to the existant literature. 
 Moreover, when theorizing expenditure efficiency in such entities, past scholars 
(Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Dell’Anno & Mourao, 2012) often highlight the importance 
of fiscal illusion-related misperceptions. The apparent influence of community 
sensitization on fiscal illusion-expenditure efficiency linkages is always downplayed 
except in few studies (Ferrari & Manzi, 2014; Francis & Robert, 2003). 
Thus, this research impacts theory by critically examining how fiscal illusion 
theoretical underpinnings relate to fiscal illusion-community sensitization-expenditure 
efficiency relationships. Besides, it evaluates that theoretical influence in a post-conflict 
environment of resource-strapped economies of the developing world. 
In terms of implication to practice, this study suggests that local government 
authorities must always be conversant with the role fiscal illusion plays in the expenditure 
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efficiency equation. As rightly observed by Gemmell, Morrissey & Pinar (2002), Gupta 
& Marijn (2001), and Mourao (2006), understanding the fiscal illusion dynamics is a key 
task for entity administrators, employees, and political representatives in executing 
spending mandates effectively. 
Furthermore, entity leadership whether in conflict-ridden environs or not, should 
never ignore the relevancy of community sensitization in attaining expenditure efficiency. 
The sensitization factor is often sidelined due to associated trauma contrary to previous 
empirical evidence (e.g. Ferrari & Manzi, 2014). 
In conclusion, this research takes a step in creating understandability of the fiscal 
illusion-community sensitization-public expenditure efficiency connections in local 
government. While the situation may be different in the developed world, local entity 
expenditure efficiency in poor and developing nations such as those of Sub-Saharan 
Africa seems to be a big challenge. In Uganda’s post-conflict northern region, attaining 
acclaimed expenditure efficiency standards is yet to be seen. 
Recommendations 
Generally the study findings highlight the expected causal linkage in the fiscal 
illusion-community sensitization-public expenditure efficiency framework predicted by 
the fiscal illusion theory. However, we did not investigate the reigning inter-variable 
causality in its fullness. As indicated in related studies (Clemens & Miran, 2012; 
Congleton, 2001; Devas, Delay & Hubbard, 2001), three alternative research designs are 
proposed to strengthen causality evidence. 
First, a longitudinal research design capable of capturing pre-conflict data. This can; 
for instance, facilitate more effective investigation of community sensitization as an 
actual mediator factor. However, identifying proper units of analysis prior to conflict may 
be a challenge due to forecast unpredictability (Congleton, 2001; Devas, Delay & 
Hubbard, 2001). 
Second, an experimental design could potentially isolate all causal effects. But as 
noted Clemens & Miran (2012), conducting experimental research in natural and largely 
rural-based locality settings of Africa, may be very problematic. Besides, such a research 
design is likely to suffer common methods variance, multicollinearity, and validity 
setbacks (Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2008). 
Third, a systematic research agenda is also proposed. According to Congleton 
(2001), the approach involves collecting both respondent observational data on a 
longitudinal basis and back-up documentary evidence. However, such a strategy may be 
compromised by post-conflict trauma conditions if executed in a setting like that of 
northern Uganda. 
The present study presents a number of findings in regard to local entity fiscal 
illusion-community sensitization-public expenditure efficiency triangulation. However, 
several of the findings require further research. One potential explanation for attaining 
meaningful expenditure efficiency was that fiscal illusion be addressed at local level. If 
this position is maintained, then the role of central government would be overlooked. 
On the basis of fiscal illusion theory (Oates, 1991; Wagner, 1976) and any other 
related theory, it is therefore important for upcoming research to equally consider the 
central authority influence in the expenditure efficiency endeavors of its local 
governments. Additionally, future research should investigate community sensitization 
mediation in the fiscal illusion-public expenditure efficiency relationship in regular and 
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non-post-conflict entity settings. Comparative findings (Clemens & Miran, 2012; Ferrari 
& Manzi, 2014; Gupta & Marijn, 2001) will significantly enrich the local expenditure 
efficiency knowledge body and enhance the broad fiscal federalism stream. 
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